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The EU budget process encourages deadlock and makes
large reforms almost impossible. The best that reformers can
hope for is gradual change.
by Blog Admin
Ahead of tomorrow’s European Council summit to discuss the EU budget, Peter Becker
assesses the prospects for EU heads of state and government reaching a deal. He argues
that the negotiation process facilitates deadlock between member states because it is
dominated by concerns over the net balance paid into the budget by individual countries.
The process also makes reform extremely difficult as there is a large degree of ‘path-
dependency’, where states that benefit from existing programmes are unwilling to agree to
cuts in expenditure. In this context the best that can be hoped for is a gradual
reconfiguration of EU spending.
On November 22 and 23 the European heads of  state and government will try to strike a deal on the next
European Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The MFF is the centrepiece of  the European Union’s
budget policy and f inancial programming. It sets the maximum volume f or the annual budgets and the
main spending policies and thus def inesEurope’s policy priorit ies. The European Union started to
negotiate its f if th MFF on 29 June 2011 when the European Commission presented its proposal.
However, shortly bef ore the decisive summit this week it seems unlikely that a compromise will be
reached af ter f ierce struggles.
Traditional lines of  conf lict characterise
these negotiations. The antagonism
between member states that are net
payers and net receivers is still
paramount, but there are also
distribution conf licts between individual
policy areas, especially agriculture and
cohesion. From the perspective of
governments and parliaments of  the
member-states, the net balance
remains the decisive point f or
assessing the outcome. National
negotiating strategies are
consequently characterised by the
relationship between gross payments
into the EU budget via the EU’s own resources mechanism and the returns f rom EU spending
programmes, especially under the two largest budget headings. France f or example, as a major net payer,
seeks to restrict the volume of  the EU budget while at the same time, as the biggest recipient of
agricultural spending, retaining a special interest in def ending Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies
in the EU budget. Germany f or its part seeks to avoid tangible cuts in European Structural Funds that
would reduce its returns and worsen the German net balance. The Finnish government is in a similar
posit ion, declaring its openness f or cuts in all policy areas including the Structural Funds but seeking
exceptions f or the thinly populated Lapp regions of  its f ar north. The Brit ish f ollow a comparable logic,
but f ocusing on the revenue side because their budget rebate always reduces the Brit ish net payment
regardless of  their returns f rom European spending programmes. In short, the f ocus on national net
balances af f ects the EU’s spending priorit ies.
Thus the EU seems to be heading f or deadlock and apparently nobody knows how to avoid it. Even
worse, a probable result of  the negotiations is that a new MFF would be f ar f rom meeting the standards,
expectations or criteria that apply to national public budgets. The EU budget, crit ics say, is primarily used
to f und redistributive policies with marginal growth ef f ects, and the prohibit ion on borrowing robs the
Union of  the f lexibility to respond to short- term challenges, because spending and revenues must
always balance. Moreover, the EU cannot make its own autonomous decisions about how to f und its
budget. Certainly, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council share
this crit icism in general – if  not in all points. Decision-makers in the EU and member-states have
repeatedly acknowledged the necessity to overhaul the EU budget, and underlined the need f or action.
But if  that is the case why have no f undamental ref orms to address the problems yet been considered or
implemented?
This paradox stems above all f rom the extreme path-dependency of  the European budget system. Every
compromise reached consolidates institutional structures and increases the costs of  change, even as
the outcomes of  the negotiations become ever less convincing and indeed unsatisf actory f or those
involved. In particular, the net payments logic means that the large paymasters to the European budget
are not really interested in bold ref orms of  European spending policies. Ref orming CAP and Cohesion
f unds would involve ref ocusing spending priorit ies and cutting subsidies. These ref orms, theref ore,
could mean reduced f lows back f rom the EU budget to the net payers and theref ore a more negative
net-payment balance. In addition to this, risk of  loss in terms of  return f lows through ref orm of  the
biggest spending policies would be loaded with domestic quarrels, as the national benef iciaries (regions
or f armers) would inevitably f ace a reduction in EU f unds. Thus any f undamental change to European
spending policies init ially brings only increased insecurity and uncertainty as well as reduced predictability,
especially where the national net balance is concerned. This diminishes members’ willingness to f ully
subscribe to a ref orm of  the EU budget and prevents solutions f rom being f ound that are orientated
toward a common European interest. The member states tend to stick to existing agreements and
saf eguarding the status quo.
In addition, the negotiating process f ollows a well- trodden inf ormal path with various assigned roles. The
European Council’s f irst attempt to agree an overall compromise usually f ails, upping the pressure on all
involved to reach consensus. At the same time this helps the heads of  state and government to justif y
the f inal outcome to their own populations and national media and to demonstrate convincingly that they
f ought to the last f or their own national f inancial and budget interests. Af ter matters have come to a
head agreement is generally reached at the second attempt, of ten af ter long and contentious bilateral
and multilateral talks and repeated rows during the concluding summit meeting of  the heads of  state and
government.
In this negotiating environment a gradual reconf iguration is the best that can be expected, in the sense
of  a pragmatic shif t ing of  spending priorit ies. In view of  these polit ical realit ies, there seems litt le point in
disseminating yet more normative proposals f or an ideal European Financial Framework, priorit ies and
public goods the EU should pay f or, and how it should f und its budget f airly and adequately. Nor is the
current round of  negotiations moving towards an optimised EU budget adequate to the theoretical
requirements of  f inancial f ederalism. Instead the strong current of  polit ical realism f orces negotiators to
f ind a result acceptable to member-state governments and parliaments within the prescribed timef rame.
Theref ore instead of  thinking about the best possible European budget it appears more f easible to
choose the path of  inconspicuous gradual and sustainable ref orms within the existing European
spending priorit ies. The policies should be aligned with the new f unding objectives, thus shif t ing the
longer-term substantive priorit ies of  agricultural and cohesion policy. The budget headings could keep
their old names, remaining f ormally unchanged and retaining their symbolic meaning, but being used to
f und new policies. The substance of  the policies then can be gradually reoriented through incremental
changes. Only at the end of  the ref orm process and the f inancial “weaning” can the policies f inally be
redef ined. But by that t ime this will no longer be understood as a f undamental change of  direction. 
This article is based on the SWP Research Paper, ‘”Lost in Stagnation: The EU’s Next Multiannual Financial
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